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1. McTaggart’s two temporal series characterize one dimension of time
1.1  McTaggart [6] identified two different series that characterize time. There is the B-series and the 
A-series.
“Positions in time, as time appears to us prima facie, are distinguished in two ways.
Each position is Earlier than some, and Later than some, of the other positions. And
each position is either Past, Present, or Future. The distinctions of the former class 
are permanent, while those of the latter are not. If M is ever earlier [for time-like 
separated events] than N, it is always earlier. But an event, which is now present, 
was future and will be past.” 
 
I will not follow McTaggart to the conclusion that time is unreal, but suggest that time is real and 1 
dimension of time has both B-series and A-series characteristics, which is called an A-theory of time. 
I would argue the A-series is not reducible to the B-series in any way, and is a part of a comprehensive 
view of time. The A-series consists in the ‘ontologically privileged’ present moment or ‘now’, and 
becoming.  
1.2 In the theory of time of this paper, instead of saying 
1.2.1 'time goes from past to present to future'
it would be more appropriate to say that 
1.2.2 'time goes from earlier times to later times as it becomes from future into the present and then into
the past'
As later and later times become present, time goes on.
1.3 The idea will then be that each system has an A-series that is 'ontologically private' to that system, 
while retaining the ontologically public (but relativized) B-series interrelations. These are 'private' 
now's, so, presumably, the apparent 'universal now' that contains even every quantum system results 
from some kind of averaging over the more-or-less ubiquitous private nows.
2. Fragmentalism
2.1 Fine [2] introduced the notion of fragmentalism. The idea was that reality is ontologically divided 
up into fragments. One way to put this is to say that in one fragment there is no fact of the matter about 
the value of the relevant parameters in another fragment. In physics there have been several 
interpretations of the ‘fragmental’ notion. I’ll briefly note three of them and then propose a third.
In Fine’s original fragmentalism, it is supposed that different relativistic frames of reference form 
different fragments, so that what is true in a rest frame of reference is not necessarily true in a frame 
with a (relative) velocity. This is problematic, as Hofweber et al. [3] note, as different relativistic 
frames of reference can be accommodated within one ontological ‘fragment’ (related by the Lorentz 
transformations) together.
2.2 Another notion of fragmentalism has been to apply it to quantum mechanics in the following sense. 
If Schrodinger’s Cat is in the state 
2.2.1 [psi> = [alive> + [dead>
then each of the basis vectors [alive> and [dead> form two different fragments, Simon [8]. This is also 
problematic, as Iaquinto et al. [4] argue. It cannot be that each vector forms a fragment, since in the 
fragment of the reference (quantum) system the state of the cat is the one vector [psi>, given by the 
sum of the two basis vectors taken together.
2.3 Yet another notion of fragmentalism is to posit that positions on the A-series each form different 
fragments, as in Torrengo et al. [10], or, in other words, different perspectives, as in Ludlow et al. [5], 
and Slavov [9].
2.4 The notion of fragmentalism proposed in this article is that each quantum system (no matter how 
small/simple/non-local forms a fragment. And that is related to the (panpsychist) idea that each 
quantum system has it’s own A-series. For the A-series parameters in more than 1 fragment there is no 
fact of the matter as to their joint values.
3. The Big Bang
3.1 Here are two interesting cases involving both the B-series and the A-series.
3.2 the big bang was infinitely earlier than now (in the B-series) and finitely far in the past (in the A-
series)
and
3.3 the big bang was finitely earlier than now (in the B-series) and infinitely far in the past (in the A-
series)
I would argue that case (3.3) is a better model than case (3.2). We find the big bang to be 13.8 billion 
years ago. But this leaves open the question of why it didn’t happen a billion years before such that we 
are also a billion years before now. (These are empirically indistinguishable only on some models of 
time.)
In case (3.3) the number of seconds that the big bang is earlier than now could remain at 13.8 billion 
years. But as we go further and further into the past, toward the big bang, it could be that we have to go
ever further into the past, i.e. to successively go 1 second earlier in the B-series requires going 
progressively to a larger and larger extent into the past as we approach the Big Bang. That is the first 
basic idea of this note.
See the appendix for the definition of the rate r, which is given as B-seconds per A-’seconds’ in defined 
units of seconds/e.
For case (3.3) we have r → 0 sec./e
 Quantum systems form distinct fragments. In the Fragmentalist Presentist interpretation of quantum 
mechanics [7] a mutual measurement/observation is given when and only when there is a collapse of 
the wavefunction, described by projecting in a Hilbert space. Such a projection updates the value of the
rate r for each system. 
This model therefore predicts that as one goes back in time toward the big bang there will be a larger 
and larger number—tending toward an infinity—of quantum interactions per second. If we take the 
speed of light c = 1 m/sec. as a conversion factor, then the closer we get to the big bang the larger the 
number of quantum interactions per 4-volume. This looks like it approaches an infinite number of 
interactions—and therefore temperature—at the singularity. That is the second basic idea of this note.
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5. Appendix 1: Rates of temporal flow
Start with a parameter  t whose unit is change in B-series, an interval, in for example seconds. Add a
parameter τ whose unit is not an interval in B-series clock time: in AB-theory, τ is the parameter of the
A-series, and “e” will be a unit of temporal becoming (e does not denote electric charge here). Let τ be
the future-present-past spectrum. The idea will be es coordinatize τ the way seconds coordinatize t.
Define an indexical clock to be a clock that's not accelerating, has relative velocity 0 meters-per-
second, and is spatially local, to a centered inertial reference frame, all in terms of a B-series.
Define 
5.1  1 e is what becoming is like for 1 second of indexical clock time
If becoming is indeed phenomenal in the way that qualia are, then, it could be argued, it must be 
'defined' or 'referred to' in this curious 'what it is like' way, on salient views. E.g. a green quale is 
defined as 'what it is like' to experience green. The necessity of doing this has to do with their 
ineffability. e can be well-defined for each τ for a system. Further, a second is well-defined across 
systems such as Alice and a protozoan, even though the protozoan doesn't have the mental capacities 
Alice does. It's plausible that it's the same way with 1 e of A-series time. 
Just the way one can re-define seconds to be longer or shorter than the usual seconds, one can re-define
es to be further or closer into the future (or past) than the usual es. The physically significant stuff 
should be invariant under these changes.
Define  
 
5.2  r sec./e = - d(Alice's B-series)/d(Alice's A-series)
as the change in 1 second of indexical clock time per change in e, for any quantum system Alice (no 
matter how small or non-local), which defines Alice’s fragment. For example, the position of a particle 
at 1 second later than t = 0 is also 1 e closer to the present from the future (or further into the past from 
the present) relative to some event for the ‘flat’ case of AB-spacetime with the obvious coordinitazition.
The minus sign accounts for the fact that increasing B-series times become into the decreasing A-series 
times, assuming positive numbers of e are in the future and negative numbers are in the past.
The countdown to a rocket liftoff, 10… 9… 8… could be seen as counting the number of es. When the 
announcer says ‘10’ this means that the liftoff, if it is going to happen, is 10 e in the future of the 
control center. In the case of ‘flat’  AB-spacetime, in the relevant coordinate system, the liftoff is also 
10 seconds later than the clock-time when the announcer says ‘10’. When the announcer says ‘9’ this 
means the liftoff, if it is going to happen, is 9 e in the future of the control center. However, the 
beginning of the countdown is still 10 seconds earlier than the liftoff—it’s just that 1 second has 
receded 1 e into the past.
We would say ‘3 minutes later than 2 pm’. But, supposing it is now 2 pm, we would not say ‘3 minutes 
in the future of ‘now’’. Instead we would say ‘3 e in the future of ‘now’’.
Consider the rate r = 2 sec./e. This can be interpreted as meaning there are 2 seconds of indexical clock 
time per unit of becoming. That would imply that, for 1 e, 2 seconds go by, so earlier-to-later relations 
would appear to go by faster. This would be like the ‘sped up movie’ metaphor in which time goes by at
twice the usual rate.
Let the rate r be in units of seconds/e. The general idea is then
5.3
r > 1 B-series time appears sped up (earlier-times to later-times appear to be going by faster than 
normal).
r = 1 the change in B-series information per change in A-series information is given by 1 second of 
indexical clock time per unit e of becoming. This unit e is assumed to be applicable to each 
panpsychist system, the way 1 second of indexical clock time is applicable to such systems 
as a macroscopic Alice or a protozoan.  
0 < r < 1    B-series time goes by slowed down.
r = 0 B-series time appears stopped (but the appearance goes on as usual in the A-series)
r < 0 time appears (from future to present to past) to be going backward in B-series time, i.e. later 
times to earlier times, e.g. time-reversal, or watching the movie go backward.
One may define (for example) dr/de which would have something to do with the rate of becoming 
accelerating through the A-series. e-2 would be something like “per unit of becoming, per unit of 
becoming”.
We could consider the difference in the rates of time’s becoming in a general relativistic context. Let 
clock c2 be above the surface of the earth and clock c1 be 1 meter directly above c2. Let c2’s time be 
given by T(τ, t) and c1’s time be give by T'(τ', t'). General relativity tells us that c2 runs slower than c1. 
So
 5.4 dt/dt' < 1 sec./sec.'
Each clock registers that later and later respective times are becoming into their respective presents at a
rate of 1 in their own fragments,
5.5  dt/dτ = 1 sec./e, dt'/dτ' = 1 sec.'/e'      
                 
which allow one to calculate that 
5.6  dt/dτ' < 1 sec./e', dt'/dτ > 1 sec.'/e
     
We could try to compute 
5.7  dT'/dT
except (5.7) treats T' and T functionally equally and therefore with an equal reality, contradicting 
fragmentalism.
Let x be the position of a point particle defined relative to a chosen origin in a particular system. One 
may define dx/dt, the 'rate' at which the position of the particle changes with respect to the B-series 
time t, i. e. with respect to the 'time' going from earlier times to later times, in units of meters/second. 
One may define dx/dτ, the 'rate' at which the position of the particle changes as it 'becomes' from the 
system's future into the system's present and then into the system's past, in units of meters/e. This 
neither assumes nor implies the future is predetermined, as there may be many futures which are 
consistent with the system's present state.
In high school we learn to plot the position x of a classical point-particle as a function of time, i.e. we 
plot x(t). But here t is a B-series. But then we can also plot x(τ) where τ is an A-series. In this latter 
case x(5) means the position x at 5 e in the future (which might be wholly or partially in the present 
given a thick present). x(0.1) means the position x at 0.1 e in the future(/present). x(-2) means the 
position at 2 e in the past(/present). Thus with the more complete notion of time we want to plot x(τ, t), 
or x( T(τ, t) ).
If a clock ‘slows down’ as it falls into a black hole, from our viewpoint, then the rate r = [sec.'/e] 
decreases in magnitude. 
5.8 One interesting feature of this interpretation is that the enlarged ‘presentist spacetime’ is, within 
each fragment, described by five parameters (namely, an A-series parameter τ, a B-series parameter t, 
and the three space parameters xa) and not four parameters (namely, a B-series parameter t, and the 
three space parameters xa) as in the case of Minkowsi space.
With the definition of the rate r in hand, for each fragment, we are lead to a generalization of the 
Lorentz transformations.
6. Appendix 2: Einstein’s Train in the Fragmentalist Presentist Interpretation
6.1 Einstein’s train thought experiment considered [1].
6.2 Suppose Alice is standing in the middle of the platform of a train station and lightning strikes each 
end of the platform simultaneously in her reference frame. She knows the strikes were simultaneous in 
her reference frame because after each strike a message is sent to her about when it happened.
6.3 Suppose Bob is standing in the middle of a train car that is the length of the platform in the rest 
frame of the car, and that the car is moving past the station.
6.4 The two lightning strikes will not be simultaneous in Bob’s frame of reference.
6.5 It is often concluded that there is no ontologically privileged present moment, or no unique ‘now’, 
since if there were such a moment it would be simultaneous with itself (!), and therefore could not 
encompass both Alice’s frame of reference and Bob’s frame of reference.
6.6 We’ll propose a flavor of presentism that is consistent with (1.1) – (1.3), looking at the train thought
experiment in more detail. The basic idea will be that the Alice’s system forms an ontological fragment 
that does indeed have a unique present moment that extends throughout all of space. Within her 
fragment Bob’s (relatively moving) frame of reference is modified by the Lorentz transformations. But 
her fragment does not contain the information of Bob’s unique present moment. And vice versa. There 
is just no fact of the matter about both present moments taken together.
6.7 Einstein’s train thought experiment reconsidered.
6.8 Alice stands at the train station in the middle of the platform, ready for the experiment to 
commence. She is ‘always’ in her ontologically privileged present moment. This is empirically given 
data. Suppose the train car containing Bob (who is of course at rest relative to the train car) moves past 
the platform.
Many pairs of events that are simultaneous in Alice’s frame of reference will not be simultaneous in 
Bob’s frame of reference. Indeed the space and time of Bob’s frame of reference are modified by the 
Lorentz transformations from the perspective of Alice.
6.9 So far, there is no contradiction, because we’ve only talked about Alice’s present moment (given by
her A-series), her clock-times (given by her B-series), and the clock times in Bob’s frame of reference 
(given by his B-series).
6.10 The idea is then that Alice’s A-series defines her ontological fragment. The contradiction comes in
only if we add the postulate that Bob has a unique present moment in Alice’s fragment. But this 
postulate is avoided if we suppose that Bob’s A-series delineates his own fragment—one that is distinct
from Alice’s fragment—and is one in which there is no information about Alice’s unique present 
moment.
Alice’s fragment contains the information of Alice’s A-series, Alice’s B-series, and Bob’s B-series. But 
Alice’s fragment does not contain the information of Bob’s A-series, and vice versa. As they pertain to 
two different fragments, there is explicitly no ‘simultaneous’ fact of the matter about both Alice’s A-
series (and therefore her present moment and her ‘becoming’) and Bob’s A-series (and therefore his 
present moment and his ‘becoming’).
In Alice’s fragment, Bob’s B-series is modified by Lorentz transformations. And in Bob’s fragment, 
Alice’s B-series is modified by the corresponding Lorentz transformations.
6.11 In this way, a present moment that extends throughout space is relativised (so to speak) to each 
fragment, and no contradiction ever arises.
6.12 This concludes the Fragmentalist Presentist account of the Einstein’s train thought experiment. 
6.13 Epilogue to Einstein’s Train
6.14 Clearly there is a great deal more to say. But the aim of this note was to only focus on the 
train/station thought experiment because that is one of the clearest arguments showing the relativity of 
simultaneity and the (erroneous) conclusion that presentism is untenable.
6.15 At the risk of oversimplification, the slogan here might be that the time of quantum mechanics is a
(fragmentalist) A-series, and the time of relativity is a B-series, with the understanding that these two 
temporal series are not entirely independent. But, again, the intention of this note was to focus narrowly
on the train/station thought experiment.
7. Appendix 3: Where did the Big Bang come from? Do qualia exist necessarily?
Why is there something rather than nothing? I don’t know. And if there were absolutely nothing—not 
even potential logical structures or time or … it’s difficult to see how things could get off the ground. 
But it’s simply not clear that that’s the right question. It may be that it requires fewer (weaker) 
assumptions to allow that there are possibilities. If that’s the case, we may at least consider the 
existence of such-and-such possibility.
Now, suppose we have the existence of the possibility p1, 2 + 3 = 5, which is to say, if there were 2 
things (physical, numerical, etc.) and 3 (other) things, then there would be 5 things. But this already 
gives us other information. For example, it rules out the existence of the possibility p2, 2 + 3 = 6. So p1 
rules out p2.
We want to consider the possibility ‘(a particular shade of the quale) red exists’. The problem here is 
that this simply does not rule out that what ‘red’ means within the possibility is not what we would call 
‘green’ (for example). The locution ‘red exists’ does not rule out that ‘red’ could refer to any particular 
quality whatsoever. Thus, ‘red’ cannot be part of the existence of the possibility, as the possibility does 
not mean what we want it to mean.  
Instead, we have the existence of the possibility p3 that
7.1  ██ exists
which is to say, if there were ██ then red would exist.
 (This is an example of what I have elsewhere called a qualation.)
Now, (7.1) rules out that the possibility in question could be talking about anything other than red 
qualia and (I would claim) it is the only way to do so. But notice that to merely specify the possibility 
of the existence of red qua redness, we had to give an actual red. Otherwise, the possibility does not 
know (so to speak) what is meant by ‘red’. So in p1 and p2 we have it that the subjunctive ‘if there were 
…’ does not require the actual existence of anything, but in p3 we have it that the subjunctive ‘if there 
were …’ does require the actual existence of some particular thing.
What I have been struggling to argue is that ‘the possibility red’ must itself contain actual redness, 
since otherwise the possibility cannot specify what it is a possibility of. If this possibility wants (so to 
speak) to rule out that it is the possibility of the existence of greenness, then it must specify ‘red’ in the 
possibility in such a way that it can be differentiated from ‘green’. But a mere name for a color cannot 
do this. The only way to do this is to use the actual quale of redness. 
The conclusion is that the mere possibility of the existence of redness requires the actual existence of 
redness. Otherwise the possibility cannot specify which quale it is the possibility of.
But this is exactly the behavior of the A-series. We may suppose each state has a prior state, but, as 
Leibniz pointed out, there is then the question of where the whole sequence of states came from. But in 
our (fragmentalist) ontic perspectivalism there is no perspective from which the whole sequence of 
states can be surveyed, so the sequence taken as a whole does not need an explanation. 
This argument evidently applies to any possible quale whatsoever. On the one hand that sounds bad. 
But on the other hand, it could turn out that physical laws and physical things can be understood as 
particular kinds of qualia.
Anyway, on panpsychism, idealism, or neutral monism, we may have solved the question of where the 
Big Bang came from.
This would also solve the problem of evil: pain exists in the universe because it, too, is qualia.
7.2 … but again: how do you get something from Nothing? But, again: is Nothing really the state of 
affairs (if such exist) with the weakest assumptions? At very least this would require an argument. 
These ideas are surely not new with this paper; I’m still in the process of find antecedents.
Consider the following two arguments. 
7.2.1
1. Suppose there is Nothing.
2. If there is Nothing, then it is possible for there to be Nothing.
3. If it is possible for there to be Nothing, then there exists the possibility (in a 2nd-order sense) that 
there is nothing.
4. If that possibility exists, something exists.
Moreover,
7.2.2
5. At first we want to say that Nothing means Nothing and therefore even a possibility does not exist.
6. But if the possibility of Nothing does not exist, then it is impossible for there to be Nothing.
7. If it is impossible for there to be Nothing, then something exists.
Do 7.1.1 and 7.1.2 show there is something rather than Nothing? At the very least, they show that what 
the weakest assumption(s) is is not such a straight-forward question. 
8. Appendix 4: Differences Between equations and qualations; Zombies, and Mary
8. I’d like to discuss the qualations. These are two questions that in the correct language are different 
questions:
8.1 Why is my red the internal, subjective, phenomenal, red?
8.2 Why is my red ██?
These are subtly but, I would contend, profoundly different questions. The first question elicits in the 
mind of the reader a thought/concept/idea about red qualia. The second question elicits in the mind of 
the reader red qualia. 
There are differences between (8.1) and (8.2). But before moving on to some of these it should be said 
that for the reader who understands these questions to be the same question, he or she has not 
understood the questions in the correct language. In particular, it is possible have a thought about red 
qualia elicited by (8.1) and to make the mistake of having (only) a thought about red qualia elicited by 
(8.2). That would be a misunderstanding.
(8.2) might be called a qualation, the idea being that it is like an equation whose expression involves 
qualia.
The first thing to say is that, for those of us who understand the language, there are solutions that 
suggest themselves to question (8.1) that are nevertheless clearly not solutions to question (8.2). These 
include, but are not limited to, tenets of materialism, physicalism, functionalism, informationism, 
emergentism, mathematical-realism, etc. This mistake results from the fact that in (8.1) we have only a 
thought about red, so it (experientially) seems like a thought about a brain could answer the question. 
In the correct language (8.2) does not give a thought about. There is strictly different information in the
questions (8.1) and (8.2). In fact, (8.1) is not a hard problem at all but merely points to a hard problem. 
This is the classic mistake of mistaking the finger pointing to the moon for the moon.
The second thing to say is that the copyright of this paper must insist on actual red to reproduce 
question (8.2). This is in contrast to all philosophy papers in all philosophy journals to date. This is a 
consequence of understanding the correct language mentioned above.
The third thing to say is that (8.2) is an example of a hard problem, and there are many of them: at least
one for each quale.
The fourth thing to say is that (8.2) makes it clear that a solution to this hard problem must include red 
qualia in the answer, since otherwise there is no way to specify precisely what the solution is a solution
to. (For example a solution to a hard problem that involves only an abstract (mathematical) class of 
qualia would not do the job. That solution could be given in black ink on white paper/screens.)
The fifth thing to say is that a problem that is not only referred to but (supposed to be) given in the 3rd-
person is not sufficient to state a hard problem in the language mentioned above.
The sixth thing to say is to note that many researchers talk about the somewhat artificial taxonomy of 
‘Western’ approaches to consciousness versus ‘Eastern’ approaches to consciousness. To be frank, aside
from cultural differences, you cannot get any more Western than (1) and you cannot get any more 
Eastern than (8.2).
The seventh thing to say is to give an explanation of how I know I’m not a zombie. The answer is that
—in the correct language—the experience of red in (8.2) is pre-theoretical. Yes, I can think about (8.2) 
and spin a theory of its red based on thoughts about it. But the data does not rely on any such thoughts. 
The data comes before any thought that could be wrong about it. The data comes before any thought 
that could be wrong about it. 
Now, I cannot be sure that you are not a zombie. But that is because my notion of ‘you’ relies on 
thoughts constructed in my mind. And thoughts about can (generally) always be wrong. This includes 
thoughts about your behavior and thoughts about my own behavior. Similarly, you can (presumably) be
sure you are not a zombie (if you understand the correct language) and yet not be sure that I am not a 
zombie.
So the question about Mary in the black-and-white room who knows everything there is to know about 
color and is then released into a colorful world is misstated. It is not whether she experiences 
something new. It is whether I experience something new.
9. Appendix 5: How to Answer Hard Problems, if possible
Elsewhere I’ve given a method for answering hard problem. First, induce a brain process that is 
correlated to seeing red (for example). Second, note the class(es) of brain processes that are correlated 
to answering a ‘why?’ question. Third, induce both the process correlated to seeing (and focusing on) 
red and a process correlated to answering a ‘why?’ question simultaneously. If there is an answer, it 
should then be subjectively forthcoming. (Of course there could be a complication if the ‘why?’ 
processes are strictly different for answering a hard problem. But there might not be.)  
10. Appendix 6: On the efficaciousness of consciousness
As of this writing, I’m puzzled by something (though perhaps others are not). If subjective experience 
is irrelevant to evolutionary survival, then it’s not clear why a cohesive physical body that operates and 
survives in a particular environment should be correlated to a cohesive subjective experience when that
body operates. It is perfectly possible that a human brain be correlated to an incohesive and, for all 
intents and purposes, random, subjective experience, as the body would still fulfill the evolutionary 
requirements for survival and promulgation. Thus ‘what it’s like’ to be a human should make no more 
sense than ‘what it’s like’ to be a physical system chosen at random.
Is that an argument for the causal efficaciousness of subjective experiences over-and-above their 
physical correlates? I don’t know.
Maybe the immediacy of consciousness has something to do with it. That is, consciousness seems to 
happen in, and only in, the present (of McTaggart’s A-series). And it could be this is one place causality
surpasses mere mechanical causation, which is plausibly based on the B-series. The generalization to 
quantum mechanics: collapse happens in and only in the present of a (fragmentalist) reference system 
(Merriam); probabilistic or collapse behavior could be an opening for where metal causation comes 
into play (Chalmers); at collapse the (physical) conservation of Energy is violated (Carroll). (In fact, 
because of the violation of the conservation of energy at collapse, something odd has to be going on 
with time, as they are related by Noether’s theorem.)
Alice’s choice of experimental arrangement of her own free will ‘over here’ can affect the outcome of 
Bob’s experiment ‘over there’. Free will will mean at least that the state is not a function of states that 
are only in her past (and future?) light-cone. Funny how philosophers of consciousness generally 
assume the ‘causal closure’ of the physical, while philosophers of quantum mechanics generally 
assume free will, in the above sense, to chose the orientation of an experimental apparatus for a given 
experiment (given no super-determinism).
Maybe consciousness is such that it tries to increase its capacity (at collapses), regardless of what 
physical semi-correlates are doing. Thus, at collapse, the ‘next’ state is not determined only (if at all) by
the physical laws governing the previous states, but by the consciousness of the system, which is to be 
somewhat independent of the physical states/processes and perhaps functions of the brain (which 
means at least that you can vary one without changing the other in some cases, or at least (or only?) 
that part of consciousness that has to do with intentionality).
